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TRANSPARENCY AND OPACITY IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL GRANDFATHERING 
by Jonathan R. NASH, Professor of Law, Emory University 
School of Law, Atlanta, U.S.A1. 
 
egulatory schemes designed to further sustainable 
development – whether through pollution control or 
natural resources preservation – often employ 
grandfathering, that is, granting legal rights based on activity that 
predates the regulatory regime. Transparency in the context of 
grandfathering must be nuanced. Government should be 
transparent about incentives to engage in environmentally valuable 
behavior, but government should not be transparent to the extent 
that grandfathering relies on prior behavior that is detrimental to 
the environment and sustainable development.  
Consider first grandfathering based upon prior behavior that is 
environmentally detrimental – for example, allocating fishing 
quotas based upon prior years’ catches. When a government wishes 
to distribute grandfathering rights to societal actors who currently 
engage in a behavior that will soon be restricted, the societal actors 
may engage in inefficient behavior to secure additional property 
rights. Such behavior may artificially increase pollution emissions, 
prematurely and inefficiently deplete natural resources, or both. To 
minimize the undesirable incentive, the government may employ a 
“retrospective allocation” based on activities that predate the 
limitations on resource access. Legal uncertainty makes it more 
difficult for societal actors to modify their behavior. Such systems 
have become increasingly common in the context of 
environmental and natural resource regulation.    
Over time, societal actors likely will come to expect retrospective 
allocation, and act in anticipation by engaging in the behaviors on 
which they predict the allocations will be based. In order to combat 
this gaming of the system, the criteria for winning allocations must 
change over time for retrospective allocation to maintain 
effectiveness on an ongoing basis. In other words, too much 
transparency in this context leads to inefficient behavioral 
distortions and poor environmental consequences; opacity serves 
to ameliorate these outcomes. 
                                                
1 This project builds upon my prior work on environmental grandfathering.  See Jonathan 
Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and 
Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677 (2007); Jonathan Remy Nash, 
Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 809 (2009); and Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics 
of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2010).  For valuable feedback, I am grateful to 
participants in a workshop at the Second Annual Sustainability Conference for Legal 
Educators at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law for 
valuable feedback. 
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In contrast, consider grandfathering of rewards for positive 
behavior – for example, awarding credits to societal actors who 
voluntarily reduce pollution emissions before a regulatory regime 
requires such reductions, or who make factories fuel-efficient 
before increased fuel efficiency is required. Whereas distortions by 
actors in attempts to garner more grandfathering rights by engaging 
in environmentally detrimental behavior is undesirable and should 
be discouraged by relying on some measure of opacity, 
environmentally desirable behavior should be encouraged via 
transparency. Assuming the government has decided upon 
behaviors it would like societal actors to undertake, the 
government should announce those behaviors and be transparent 
about its desire to provide positive benefits in the future. Such 
transparency will “lock the government in” and create greater 
incentives for societal actors to engage in the desired behaviors 
early in time, thus providing environmental benefits even before a 
regulatory regime is enacted and become binding. 
Before proceeding, I believe it important to identify an important 
caveat to the arguments I discuss here. I do not mean here to 
endorse grandfathering as normatively desirable. As I discuss 
below, legal and economic commentators have criticized 
grandfathering as a form of “transition relief” that is, relief from a 
transition in legal rule. These commentators argue that 
grandfathering inefficiently discourages actors from anticipating 
legal changes; they assert that it would be more efficient to subject 
all societal actors immediately to new legal regimes. While (as I also 
discuss below) there are arguments in support of limited 
grandfathering under limited circumstances, the arguments I make 
here have application so long as whatever the reason, and whether 
or not it is normatively desirable grandfathering continues to play 
a prominent role in environmental regulation. 
The balance of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 
provides an overview of the role of grandfathering in 
environmental regulation. Section 2 explains how opacity should 
figure prominently in the government’s allocation of grandfathered 
rights on the basis of environmentally undesirable behavior. 
Section 3 discusses how, in contrast, the government should be 
transparent in identifying desirable behavior that it will reward with 
grandfathered rights. Section 5 concludes.  
§ 1 – GRANDFATHERING IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Environmental regulatory regimes sometimes take the form of 
systems that involve the distribution and trading of permits to (in 
some way) degrade the environment. I refer to these systems 
generally as “tradable environmental degradation permit systems”. 
Regulators sometimes design these systems to allocate permits 
based upon participants’ past behavior. For example, transferable 
quota schemes put in place to regulate fisheries sometimes allocate 
fishing quotas based upon prior fishing history. The general 
rationale is that, while preservation of the fish subject to catch 
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should be limited, the reduction in fishing should be borne 
proportionately by those who have historically participated in the 
fishery. As another example, tradable pollution permit schemes 
often allocate permits based upon the scope of participants’ prior 
polluting histories. The logic here is not to reward polluting 
behavior, but rather recognition that those who pollute engage in 
some societally desirable behavior (such as the production of a 
societally beneficial product) with pollution as a byproduct. Indeed, 
in addition to the normatively ambiguous notion of “buying off” 
politically powerful interests,2 there are several justifications for 
allocating permits based on past behavior that has led to 
environmental degradation. These include striving improving 
economic efficiency,3 encouraging socially productive 
investments,4 maintaining government legitimacy,5 and concerns of 
fairness.6    
At the same time, allocations can also factor in aspects of past 
behavior that are more societally beneficial. For example, a 
transferable fishing quota allocation might factor in besides past 
fishing history the extent to which fishers employ tools that are more 
ecologically friendly.7 And a tradable pollution permit regime might 
consider in addition to pollution history the extent to which polluters 
employ more efficient, or less pollutive, technologies.8 
Whatever the basis on which permits are to be grandfathered, the 
existence of grandfathering creates an incentive for private actors to 
engage in behavior that will garner or will be sufficiently likely to 
garner grandfathered permits. Environmental degradation permits 
                                                
2 See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1665-66 
(1999) (describing transition relief as way to compensate politically powerful interests who 
otherwise would stand to lose under, and therefore would oppose, new legal regime); for 
discussion, see Masur & Nash, supra note 1, at 400-01. 
3 See Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 
37, 38-39 (2008); for discussion, see Masur & Nash, supra note 1, at 398-99.  
4 See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 
1021, 1025, 1041-47 (2007) (arguing that vulnerability to legal transitions may discourage 
investment); Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1727-28 (noting that limited transition relief might 
be justified on grounds of investment efficiency); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic 
Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138-43 (1996); 
(arguing that without transition relief, tax incentives may become more expensive to 
government); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic 
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 582-99 (1984) (contending that absence of private insurance 
against government action may necessitate compensation for government takings in order to 
minimize suboptimally low investments); for discussion, see Masur & Nash, supra note 1, at 399-
400. 
5 See Nash, supra note 1, at 831, 833-34.; for discussion, see Masur & Nash, supra note 1, at 401. 
6 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1730-31; Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational 
Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 213 (2003) (noting that 
“competitive, evolutionary pressures” that make corporations likely to anticipate risks do 
not apply to individuals); DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 101-03 (2000); for 
discussion, see Masur & Nash, supra note 1, at 401-02. 
7 Under U.S. federal law, for example, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act directs that regional fisheries (which are allowed to implement tradable 
fishing quotas) are to develop “[c]onservation and management measures [that] [...], to 
the extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be 
avoided, minimize the mortality of such bycatch.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(9).  
8 See Nash, supra note 1, at 820 & n.44 (citing the allocation method under the sulfur 
dioxide trading program of the U.S. Clean Air Amendments of 1990).  
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are, after all, under these regimes a valuable commodity. Under a cap-
and-trade regime, the total amount of degradation is capped, and 
private actors may only engage in behavior that degrades the 
environment to the extent that they own permits. (And the value of a 
permit increases still more under a system, such as the sulfur dioxide 
trading system under the United States Clean Air Act, that allows for 
“banking” of permits for use in future time periods.9) 
Grandfathered permits thus are valuable commodities that one 
receives free of charge (and that others must spend capital to 
obtain).10 In response, it is reasonable to expect private actors to 
consider changing their behavior in order to obtain grandfathered 
permits. The question that arises is the degree to which the interests 
of private actors to alter their behavior aligns with the interests of 
society to have those behaviors changed. Sometimes private 
behavior alterations may produce an environmental benefit; in that 
case, private and public interests align. In other situations, 
however, private behavior alterations may exacerbate 
environmental problems, in which case the private and public 
interests diverge. It is this dichotomy that should drive the extent 
to which transparency or opacity drives the grandfathering 
allocation process.   
Section 3 proceeds with allocations based (at least in part) on prior 
behavior that is detrimental to the environment. Section 4 
discusses allocations based on prior behavior that is valuable to the 
environment.  
§ 2 – ALLOCATIONS BASED ON PRIOR BEHAVIOR 
THAT IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Consider how a government (whether led by a legislative or 
regulatory body) might seek to rely on the prior behavior of private 
actors that is undesirable for example, fishers’ past record at 
catching fish in allocating environmental degradation permits. 
First, the government might announce in year T that it will award 
permits starting in year T+1 based upon behavior engaged in year 
T. A potential problem with this approach is that private actors 
easily might learn of the government’s plan, and attempt to game 
the system by adjusting their year T behavior in order to secure 
more allowances in future years. This outcome is highly 
undesirable, since it means that behavior that degrades the 
environment will take place suboptimally early (since actors will, in 
effect, be engaging in detrimental behavior in order to gain permits 
to continue to engage in that behavior in the future) and at a 
suboptimally high rate.   
To avoid this opportunity for gamesmanship, the government 
might instead turn to retrospective allocation that is, an allocation 
of permits based upon a period of time during which private actors 
                                                
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(3); 40 C.F.R. § 73.36.  
10 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances 
and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 505-06 (2000) 
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are not certain that that will in fact be the case. In a simple form, 
the government might announce in year T that it will award permits 
starting in year T+1 based upon behavior engaged in year T-1. 
Here, the opportunity for gamesmanship is circumscribed (if not 
eliminated), since the allocation will be based upon a period of time 
before the allocation was a possibility. 
But there is a problem with this simple and ultimately opaque 
version of retrospective allocation: It does not square with reality. 
In particular, it relies on the plans for an environmental 
degradation permitting scheme complete with allocated permits 
remaining draped in secure opacity. In reality, however, it is hard 
to imagine a government being able to keep such plans hidden. 
This is especially the case since the formulation of a permit scheme 
complete with the details on allocating permits will often take years 
in and of itself. 
Another alternative could be to base allocation on actions taken 
not in the previous year but rather years early, in order to account 
for the time it takes to put together a permit scheme for example, 
announcing in year T that it will award permits starting in year T+1 
based upon behavior engaged in year T-5. That, however, runs the 
real risk that the ultimate allocations will be substantially divorced 
from actors’ recent behavior. This is a problem insofar as 
grounding permit allocations on prior behavior is justified at least 
in part to be fair to actors’ reasonable reliance interests.11)  
Faced with these concerns, the government might think 
strategically and realize that neither pure transparency nor pure 
opacity is the order of the day. Instead, the government might opt 
for partial opacity, by employing an allocation that distributes 
permits to actors based on behavior undertaken when those actors 
could have surmised but still could not have been certain that that 
behavior would affect the ultimate allocations. Consider, for 
example, the decision by one U.S. fishery council (an entity 
authorized under U.S. law to implement tradable fishing quotas in 
order to manage a fishery) to allocate fishing quotas to owners and 
lessees of vessels based on legal fish landings in years before the 
regulation was put in place. In particular, under a regulation that 
became effective in the mid-1990s, owners and lessees of vessels 
that made legal landings of halibut or sablefish during 1988, 1989, 
or 1990 were eligible for individual fishing quotas (IFQs); each 
such owner or lessee received a quota share based on the vessel's 
highest total legal landings of halibut and sablefish during 1984 to 
1990.40 Every year, the regional director allocated IFQs by 
multiplying the eligible person’s quota share by the annual 
allowable catch.12 The regulation rewarded behavior well prior to 
the enactment (and indeed even the design) of the provision.13 
Owners and lessees of vessels that happened to make legal landings 
during one three-year period (1988-90) but not those that made legal 
                                                
11 See supra 1 and accompanying text.  
12 50 C.F.R. §676.20(b), (f)(1). 
13 See 58 FED. REG. 59,375-03 (Nov. 9, 1993).  
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landings for 25 years prior thereto or in the years following received 
quota shares. Put another way, some owners and lessees received 
property interests in excess of the legal landings of fish that they knew 
at the time they were receiving.14  
Such an approach which I term “retrospective allocation is partially 
transparent because it envisions the government taking into account 
behavior engaged in after the public announcement of its intent to put 
in place a tradable permit scheme. At the same time, retrospective 
allocation also includes elements of opacity, insofar as, while private 
actors are fully aware of the imminent implementation of a tradable 
permit scheme (with grandfathering), they cannot be sure exactly what 
behavior will secure grandfathered permits. Under such 
circumstances, actors who do alter their behavior in the hope of 
obtaining a larger allocation do so based on (at least some degree of) 
speculation. 
Retrospective allocation employs elements of opacity to generate 
legal uncertainty, and thus to achieve two goals. First, legal 
uncertainty acts to reduce undesirable behavioral alterations. If 
societal actors are unsure of the precise method by which property 
will be allocated, then they are limited in the specific steps on which 
they can rely to obtain for them later access to the property. The 
introduction of uncertainty into the precise content of ex post rules 
limits the ability of societal actors to adjust their ex ante behavior.15 
To this logic in play, consider the allocation of fishing quotas set 
out above. In an environmental impact statement governing that 
fishing quota allocation, the fishery council explained:  
“[E]xtending [the qualifying period] beyond [1990] would 
have provided an incentive both for additional fishermen 
to enter the fishery and for previous entrants to adopt 
extreme fishing methods in order to increase their landings 
and, therefore, the [quota shares] they would receive if an 
IFQ program [were] implemented.”16 
Subsequently called upon to consider a legal challenge to the 
allocation method, a U.S. federal court found it “persuasive” that, 
“if participation in the fishery while the rule was under 
consideration had been considered, then people would have fished 
and invested in boats in order to obtain quota shares, even though 
that would have exacerbated overcapacity and made no economic 
sense independent[] of the regulatory benefit.”17 The court further 
noted:  
“Had the Secretary [of Commerce] extended the 1990 
cutoff, the incentive to pour money and time into the 
fishery in order to get a bigger quota share, for those who 
could afford a long term speculation, would have been 
enormous.”18 
                                                
14 See Nash, supra note 1, at 819.  
15 See id. at 825. 
16 Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 346 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting a 1992 
environmental impact statement). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 348.  
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For these reasons, retrospective allocation’s deployment of opacity 
provides it an advantage, in terms at least of incentive effects, over 
allocations based on a pure race to capture. But will this advantage 
persist over time? Consider the likelihood that, as the 
implementation of retrospective allocations becomes more 
commonplace, societal actors will anticipate that implementation 
and thus try to adjust their behavior to maximize the probability 
that they will obtain grandfathered rights despite the legal 
uncertainty inherent in such allocations. After all, the first time a 
retrospective allocation is implemented, societal actors will likely 
be caught completely off guard. The same may be true the second 
and third times. Eventually, however, it is reasonable to expect at 
least sophisticated societal actors to anticipate such schemes.19 
In the analogous setting of incentives for landowners to develop 
land before government restrictions on regulation take effect, 
Professor David Dana has identified two reasons to expect 
accelerated development that seem applicable to the setting of 
natural resources depletion. First, “the potential scope of 
preservation regulation is now so broad that the owners of virtually 
any undeveloped land in the United States know or should know 
that they are subject to some risk of future developmental 
controls.”20 Second, “although the potential scope of ecological 
preservation is now vast, its actual progress has been gradual. With 
respect to any particular ecological resource, the lag time between 
the date of the first serious proposal for preservation regulation 
and the actual implementation of such regulation is often many 
years.”21 If (as seems all but inevitable) there is a time lag between 
proposal of a regulation and its actual implementation such that 
societal actors have ample opportunity to anticipate and plan for 
the new regulatory regime how can retrospective allocation remain 
sufficiently uncertain in order to retain its efficacy?   
The question is made more complicated because society ordinarily 
wants societal actors to anticipate legal change. Law-and-
economics theorists argue that it is efficient for societal actors to 
anticipate, and adjust in advance to, changes of all sorts.22 
Government does not generally provide relief from these types of 
changes; legal change, they explain, should be treated no 
differently.23 And, it is not unreasonable to expect at least 
                                                
19 Cf. David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 
681 (1995) (noting that owners of undeveloped land know or should know about the risk 
of future land use control).  
20 Id. at 681. 
21 Id. at 683.  
22 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 1726 (explaining that, under the dominant law-and-
economics approach to legal transitions, transition rules that lessen the effect of legal 
regime shifts are undesirable insofar as they inefficiently discourage societal actors from 
anticipating legal change). 
23 See, for example, Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 584-87 (1986); cf. Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory 
Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1055 (2006) (noting the law and economics literature that 
views “prospective and retroactive regulatory changes as essentially equal” in that “[b]oth 
may upset expectations, creating economic winners and losers,” and that concludes that 
“[p]arties should be encouraged to anticipate legal change, whether nominally retroactive 
or prospective”). 
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sophisticated actors to anticipate legal changes.24 The introduction 
of completely random changes to the governing legal regime would 
render such anticipation impossible. 
The answer to the conundrum is constrained randomness that is, 
another injection of opacity. In a setting of a truly unanticipated 
retrospective allocation, the participants do not know even that an 
allocation is afoot. After a time, it is reasonable, and probably 
desirable, for societal actors to expect that a retrospective 
allocation scheme is indeed afoot. The key is to keep the precise 
criteria by which the allocation will be conducted random enough 
so as to discourage strategic behavioral modification. Consider, for 
example, the setting of fisheries and the allocation model described 
above: While one would expect that new IFQ systems might use 
similar criteria including reliance on historical fishing data to 
allocate IFQs, one also would expect new IFQ systems to vary the 
precise historical data on which the criteria would draw. Thus, 
where one system might rely on the three years immediately 
preceding the program, another system might rely on the six-year 
period that ended three years before the program was undertaken. 
In short, then, two doses of opacity gird retrospective allocation 
against gaming by societal actors and guard against suboptimally 
high incentives for actors to engage in environmentally undesirable 
behavior. First, the government has an incentive not to divulge in 
advance the precise method by which grandfathering rights will be 
allocated. Second, the government has an incentive to vary the 
method it uses from setting to setting, i.e., not predictably to rely 
upon the same allocation method in multiple settings.  
§ 3 – ALLOCATIONS BASED UPON BEHAVIOR THAT IS 
DESIRABLE TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
While opacity is the order of the day where grandfathered rights 
are to be distributed based on environmentally-undesirable behavior, 
transparency is called for where the behavior by which 
grandfathered rights are to be distributed is desirable. The 
government properly should have concern over and take steps to 
minimize incentives for societal actors to engage in suboptimally 
large amounts of undesirable behavior in order to obtain more 
grandfathered rights. Opacity aids in that endeavor.  
In contrast, environmentally desirable behavior is something the 
government should want to encourage. Accordingly, to the extent 
that it intends to reward that behavior with grandfathered rights, 
the criteria by which those rights will be distributed should not be 
concealed, but rather trumpeted. 
For example, commentators have observed, and reacted favorably 
to, governments using tradable credits to induce societal actors to 
undertake voluntary steps to reduce carbon emissions. On 
occasion, actors have undertaken voluntary steps even before the 
                                                
24 See Logue, supra note 6, at 213 (arguing that it is reasonable to expect sophisticated 
actors to anticipate legal changes). 
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relevant government has implemented the credit program, and 
indeed even before the precise basis according to which credits will 
be distributed has been committed to.25 The incentive for the 
government here is, far from opacity, to craft the credit allocation 
scheme to in fact reward, as much as possible, desirable behavior 
previously undertaken by private actors; otherwise, the next time 
such a program looms, actors will be reluctant to undertake 
voluntary action in advance to society’s detriment lest they 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, then, governments should be concerned about societal 
actors gaming the system and engaging in excessive environmentally 
detrimental behavior in order to capture more grandfathered rights. 
Accordingly, the government should deploy some degree of opacity 
in determining how to allocate grandfathered rights based upon 
behavior that degrades the environment.   
In contrast, the government should welcome more behavior that helps 
the environment; concerns about “gaming the system” abate when the 
behavior in question is environmentally desirable. Accordingly, 
transparency should accompany allocations of grandfathered rights 
based upon environmentally beneficial behavior.  
Of course, some allocations are hybrid in nature, grounded in both 
desirable and undesirable behavior. For example, tradable pollution 
permits might be distributed to existing polluters based both on (a) the 
environmentally undesirable measure of the scope of each polluter’s prior 
polluting history, and (b) the environmentally desirable measure of each 
polluter’s energy efficiency. The lessons here would suggest the 
government employ a mix of opacity and transparency opacity with 
respect to the undesirable behavior (that is, here, the prior polluting 
history), and transparency with respect to the desirable behavior (that is, 
here, energy efficiency).26   
                                                
25 See Nash, supra note 1, at 847. 
26 Beyond considerations of behavior that have positive and deleterious effects on the 
environment, an allocation of grandfathered rights may also take into account concerns 
of fairness. However, categorizations based upon such fairness concerns will be hard to 
manipulate. Since gaming the system in such respects would be very difficult, there seems 
little need to shield this aspect of an allocation regime in opacity. 
For example, a tradable fishing quota regime could allocate IFQs not only to owners of 
boats (as did the example discussed in the text), but also to workers on the boats. See 
Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 348 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Plaintiffs make the 
sensible argument that a crew member is just as much of a fisherman as a vessel owner.”); 
id. at 352 (“Quota shares could have been allocated to all fishermen, instead of to vessel 
owners and lessees, so that the nonowning fishermen would have something valuable to 
sell to vessel owners.”); see also Nash, supra note 1, at 833 (suggesting that “a desire to 
protect lifestyles and community cohesion,” such as what might be found in a community 
of fishers, might be a valid basis for grandfathering) and to validate norms). Yet, insofar 
as one’s status as an owner or worker is hardly manipulable, “it would not make sense to 
vary the classes of societal actors--such as owners, lessees, and workers in the fishing 
quota context--who will be entitled to allocations.” Nash, supra note 1, at 828 n.76.  
As another example, the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change was negotiated in 1997, Eileen Claussen, Carping at Kyoto, 34 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 247, 248 (2002) (book review of DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING (2001)), and entered into 
force in 2005, Erik Bluemal, Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive 
Entropy in the Regulation of the Global Public Good, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1981, 1993 (2007). In 
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Finally, none of this is to say that grandfathering is overall a 
normatively desirable outcome. It bears emphasizing again that the 
arguments here are about how best to structure a grandfathering 
regime once it has been decided that grandfathering is to take place; 
they are not arguments in favor of grandfathering itself as a 
normative matter.  
 
                                                
a clear example of retrospective allocation, the Protocol called on developed countries 
are called on to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a percentage of their 1990 
emissions levels. See Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, at 
Annex, art. 3(1) (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) (“The Parties included in Annex I shall, 
individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their 
assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per 
cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.”); see also Nash, supra 
note 10, at 508 & n.175. Yet, the percentages applicable for developing nations, such as 
former members of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc, were set at more than 100%, 
perhaps with the intention grounded in fairness of allowing these nations leeway to 
develop further before having to cut back on emissions. See Nash, supra note 10, at 522-
23. Once again, it would make little sense for treaties going forward randomly to assign 
percentages among countries; the status of a country as developed or developing is hardly 
manipulable, and indeed the introduction of randomness would undermine the fairness 
concerns the varying percentages were designed to address.  
